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Abstract 
This paper studies how certain speculative transitions in financial markets can be ascribed to a 
symmetry break that happens in the collective decision making. Investors are assumed to be 
bounded rational, using a limited set of information including past price history and expectation 
on future dividends. Investment strategies are dynamically changed based on realized returns 
within a game theoretical scheme with Nash equilibria. In such a setting, markets behave as 
complex systems whose payoff reflect an intrinsic financial symmetry that guarantees 
equilibrium in price dynamics (fundamentalist state) until the symmetry is broken leading to 
bubble or anti-bubble scenarios (speculative state). We model such two-phase transition in a 
micro-to-macro scheme through a Ginzburg-Landau-based power expansion leading to a market 
temperature parameter which modulates the state transitions in the market. Via simulations we 
prove that transitions in the market price dynamics can be phenomenologically explained by the 
number of traders, the number of strategies and amount of information used by agents, all 
included in our market temperature parameter. 
JEL classification: G14; C73 
Keywords: Agent-based modelling; Game theory; Ginzburg-Landau theory; financial symmetry 
Introduction 
Think of a pen held upright on a table with a finger, and imagine to slowly lifting your finger 
until the pen suddenly falls in an arbitrary direction as depicted in Figure 1a-b. What has this in 
common with financial market dynamics? Both are systems in which whenever a small 
fluctuation makes the system cross a critical point, the system moves into one or more definite 
states. The phenomenon where a system goes from a symmetric but disordered or random state 
(the pen can fall into any given direction) into an ordered state in which the symmetry is broken 
and the pattern is well defined (the pen is falling in one specific direction) is what characterizes 
a phase transition in physics. In this paper we develop a theoretical framework for financial 
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markets based on this phenomenological reasoning: the pen in the symmetric state is equivalent 
to price fluctuations around their fundamental value, whereas the pen falling (the symmetry is 
broken) is equivalent to price trends towards herding seen in a bubble phase or anti-bubble 
phase of the market.  
The key question we face is to explain when and why financial symmetry breaking is taking 
place, corresponding to the financial system moving from one state (or mood), where 
randomness in price movements obey no-arbitrage conditions, into another state  in which the 
price takes the route towards bubble or anti-bubble formation giving rise to arbitrage 
conditions. The first mood is the fundamental state, while the second is the speculative state. 
 A large body of literature has explored markets seen as complex systems with bounded rational 
interacting agents. A possible, while non-exhaustive list of references includes Refs. [1-9]. The 
common feature of these studies concerns the way they model dynamical interactions of agents’ 
choice, which are stylized within a ‘mean-field’ approach where the intensity of choice is 
equivalent to  a  temperature. In more depth, complex systems are assumed as “… dissipative 
structures that import free energy and export entropy in a way that enables them to self-
organize their structural content and configuration, subject to boundary limits” Ref. [8]. In such a 
reasoning, markets are assumed as thermodynamically systems where energy (order) and 
entropy (disorder) are struggling against  each other moving the markets from one state to 
another based on  their inner “temperature”.  
In our paper we take the same “anti-reductionism” (or “metaphysical”) perspective, where 
financial systems are not merely the sum of single parts but, instead, they reflect very complex 
dynamics that can be understood only by inspecting the system as a whole, enweaving  micro-to-
macro connections within a consistent economic framework that takes into account linear and 
non-linear interactions. Instead, conventional economic theory is often unable to describe such 
dynamics being based on a “reductionist” approach, in which the micro-economic behavior of a 
representative agent is first stylized using rational, bounded rational or behavioral frameworks, 
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then  next used in a synthesis of macro behaviors. In other terms, the state (or mood) of the 
system is the macroscopic result of many microscopic decisions.  
The “dissipative” financial market structure we have in mind is characterized by two macro-
configurations shaped by the spatiotemporal interactions of single agents: (1) a speculative state, 
in which single traders take the same direction (all buy or sell), leading to  market trends of 
bubbles and anti-bubbles; (2) a fundamental state, where traders put different buy and sell 
orders leading the price path to move around its fundamental value.   
Agents are assumed to be bounded rational, using a limited set of information including past 
price history (technical analysts) and expectation on future dividends (fundamentalists). 
Investment strategies are dynamically changed based on realized returns within a game 
theoretical scheme with Nash equilibria. In such a setting, the market payoff reflects an intrinsic 
financial symmetry that guarantees invariance inside the system until the symmetry is broken, 
then leading the market towards speculative scenarios. State transitions appear whenever the 
“temperature” of the market crosses a critical transition point, which marks the speculative vs. 
fundamental behaviors.  
Our main innovation is to give a formal, theoretical-based measure to such a market 
temperature.  
The collective “choice” of the system which we refer to as “aggregate decision making” is 
conducive to answer how prices are formed over time and describes states of the market, which 
Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) or even the bounded REH cannot address. Indeed, once 
asset prices and dividends are both included in the decision making process, the REH suggests 
agents should make their trading decisions based on dividends only, but the matter becomes far 
from trivial if you try to explain generally what will be the collective outcome of N people’s 
decision making. Are decisions based on the price of the asset in anticipation of future price 
behavior (speculative state), or are rather the anticipation of future dividends the only driver of 
agents’ trading decisions (fundamentalist state)?  
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Our framework is able to give an answer to this question by coarse-graining the agents’ 
interactions through the well-known Ginzburg-Landau (GL) theory in physics, used to describe 
superconducting transition in terms of a complex order parameter field. The adaptation of the 
GL theory to our problem allows us to bypass the excessively complicated microscopic 
description of moods in the markets, by means of an “order parameter” that modulates 
transitions between fundamental and speculative states without examining the micro-dynamics 
of single agents and their interaction impacts on the price path and connected market 
transitions.  
We proceed as follows. We first describes the multi-agent-based model used to describe the 
payoff functions of single agents and related impacts on market returns. Then we describe the 
rationale of market phase transitions through the GL theory, next reporting and commenting 
results from simulation study. We conclude summarizing our main contributions also outlining 
our future research agenda. 
 
Multi-agent based modeling 
The theoretical framework used to formalize the speculative and the fundamental states refers 
to the “$-Game” multi-agent based modeling approach proposed in Ref. [10], in which single 
agents make their investment decisions based on dividends and asset prices with the objective 
to maximize their profit payoff function.  
The $-Game is an extension of the Minority Game (MG), introduced in Ref. [11] and implemented 
in many studies on market price dynamics Refs. [12-14]. The basic MG scheme consists in a 
repeated game where the players choose 1 out of 2 alternatives (buy or sell) at each time step 
based on past information, and the winning agents are those in the minority group. Such a 
scheme was introduced following the leading principle in Physics for which, in order to solve a 
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complex problem one should first identify essential factors at the expense of trying to describe 
all aspects in detail. 
Similarly, the $-Game is our “minimal” model to describe and predict financial market dynamics. 
Although simple in principle, the $-Game yields rich system dynamics, the complexity of which 
can be acted upon by the choice of system parameters (memory length, liquidity, etc.). As will be 
shown below, this thereby creates a dilemma in terms of the investment strategies of the 
participants, and the pure cases of speculative vs. fundamentalist states will appear as special 
cases of the general theory. Differently from MG, in the $-Game the best strategies are not always 
targeting the minority but are shifting opportunistically between the minority and the majority. 
The mathematical definition of the model includes  players (or agents) that simultaneously 
take part in a one-asset financial market over a time horizon of  periods. At each  period, with 
 < , each player  chooses an action 	
 ∈ −1, 1, where the action −1 is a “sell” order and 
the action 1 is a ”buy” order. In submitting buy and sell orders, agents can use: (1) technical 
analysis strategies, trying to profit from past price trends, and (2) fundamental analysis 
strategies, based on expectation of future dividends. The aggregate choices that look at the past 
lead to a pure speculative state (technical analysis strategies), and the aggregate choices that 
look at the future lead to a pure fundamental state (fundamental analysis strategies). Players are 
assumed to be bounded rational, in the sense of using only a limited informational set (past price 
trends and dividends) to make their decisions, with no short-sales constraints.  
 
Speculators  
In the speculative state a majority of the agents are technical analysts (chartists) who only 
analyze past realization of prices, with no anchor on fundamental economic analysis. Each player 
observes the history of past  ∈ ℕ price movements in making decision of whether to buy or 
sell an asset. Therefore,  denotes the size of the agent’s memory or, putting in other terms, the 
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length of the signal used in the decision making process. To take decisions the players have at 
their disposal a fixed number of  strategies, which are by construction randomly assigned at the 
beginning of the game. Thus, a specific strategy  tells whether to buy or sell an equity depending 
on the past price history of up and down moves, represented as 1 (up) and 0 (down), 
respectively.  
At each time  the -th player uses his/her best (in terms of payoff see Eq. 1 below ) strategy  
taking an action 	∗
 of either buying 	∗
 = +1 or selling 	∗
 = −1 (the * is used to denote 
it is the best strategy). It follows that in general a given strategy  	  is a mapping from the set of 
histories of size  to −1,+1.  
Table 1 shows an example of a given strategy for  = 3. For all possible histories of up and 
down market moves over the last  time steps, the strategy suggests a specific action to take at  
time , namely 	ℎ	
 = ±1 with ℎ
 ∈ 0, 1". For instance, if the market went down over 
the last  = 3 days, the strategy in Table 1 suggests to buy the stock 
000 → +1. If instead the 
market went down over the last two days and then up today, the same strategy suggests to sell  

001 → −1. Note again in Table 1 that, since the price has 2 possible moves (up or down) we 
have a space of possible past paths equal to 2" = 8 bit sequences of 0’s and 1’s each one 
corresponding to a specific action −1,+1 suggested by the  strategy. This signifies that the 
space of all possible strategies is given by 2%& = 256 alternatives corresponding to each of the 8 
bit sequences. 
While a single strategy recommends an action for all possible histories (of length ), we also 
allow for agents to adopt different strategies over time. Namely, agents keep a record of the 
overall payoff each strategy would have yielded over the entire market history (i.e. not limited to 
 past periods) using a rolling window of size m, and use this record to update which strategy is 
the most profitable see Eq. (1) below. This renders the game highly non-linear: as the price 
behavior of the market changes, the best strategy of a given agent changes, which then can lead 
to new changes in the price dynamics. 
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The action corresponding to the best strategy taken by agent  at time  is denoted by 
	∗
 = ±1, while 	∗
 	 ∈ −1,+1*×, is the action profile of the entire market population, 
where ∗
 = -∗
, … , *∗ 
 	 ∈ −1,+1* corresponds to the action played by the  agents 
in period .  
The payoff / of the -th agent’s -th strategy, 	
, in period  is determined as follows: 
 /	0	
1 = 	
 − 12
 (1) 
In Eq. (1) 2
 denotes the return of the market between time  − 1 and . The payoff in the $-
Game therefore describes the gain/loss obtained by an investment strategy executed at time 
 − 1 depending on the market return in the following time step . I.e. $-Game agents are 
investors that try to predict and profit from future market movements. 2
 can in turn be 
expressed in terms of  the global order imbalance,   ∑ 4∗ 
*45-  , divided by the liquidity of the 
market 6,	as	discussed	below.	  
As proven in Refs. [15, 16] traders’ actions impact significantly on price returns and liquidity 
through a positive autocorrelation in equilibrium imbalances reflected in a positive predictive 
relation between imbalances and future returns. Price return 2
 from  − 1 to  can be then 
assumed as proportional to the order imbalance, leading to the following 
 2
 ≡ 	lnD
 − lnD
 − 1 	= λE-F 4∗ 
*45-  (2) 
with D
∙ denoting the price of the stock and λ is a parameter describing the liquidity of the 
market with λ ∝ . Note that the price goes in the direction of the sign of the order imbalance 
according to Refs. [17, 18]. 
Therefore the payoff function in Eq. (1) can be re-expressed in terms of the return function in 
Eq. (2) as: 
 /	0	
1 = 	
 − 1F 4∗ 
/6*45-  (3) 
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To summarize: in the $-Game technical analysis trading strategies are based on a rewarding 
scheme for strategies that at time  − 1 predicted the proper direction of the return of the 
market 2
 in the next time step . The larger the move of the market, the larger the gain/loss 
depending on whether the strategy properly/improperly predicted the market move. If the 
agent correctly anticipates the right direction of the market, the profit will be positive and equal 
to /λ in both the extremes where either all agents sell or buy 0–;	+1, having in fact 
−1 ×– ≡ +1 × + =  /λ from Eq. (2). 
 
Fundamentalists  
Differently from pure speculators, fundamentalist make their investment decisions based on 
fundamental economic analysis. Each player makes forecasts on future price based on expected 
dividends M
 over the entire time horizon, thereby obtaining a fundamental price DN
 
estimation equivalent to the expectation of all future dividends discounted at a constant risk-
free rate O, at which investors can buy or sell the stock : 
 DN
 = PQ RS TEU
VEQ,Q M
WXWY (4) 
with PQZM
W[ = M
 which implies in the continuum a variation in DN from  to 	 + X as a 
martingale with \ constant and X] denoting the standard Brownian motion: 
 XDN
 = \X]. (5) 
As result, a change in the fundamental price reflects the arrival of news regarding future cash 
flows of the stock.  
Buy and sell actions made by fundamentalists at time ,  	N
, are based on the value of D
 vs. 
DN
 reflecting the common rule of thumb to sell when price is high (higher than the 
fundamental), and buy when price is low (lower than the fundamental): 
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 	N
 = ^−1	_		D
 > DN
	+1	_	D
 < DN
  (6) 
Furthermore, in order to limit the sell orders whenever D
 ≫ DN
, which  would rather 
indicate a speculative scenario[22], we assume a vanishing use of the fundamental strategy 
according to a Poisson process of the form bTEc with b = d
QEde
Qf
Q . This assumption provides a 
maximum probability in choosing the fundamental strategy in correspondence with a price 
variation from its fundamental almost equivalent to the dividend yield, which makes sense given 
that the fundamental price is the expectation of future dividends. 
The payoff function for fundamentalists is the same as that of speculators (see Eqs. 
1 − 
3), 
the  only change is the action selection mechanism given by  (Eq. 6). 
 
Fine-grained market dynamics 
The formulation of the decision making process of speculators and fundamentalists via  the $-
Game leads to a financial market modeling based on 5 parameters: 
*  – The number of market participants which expresses the “physical” size of the 
market.  
*  – The memory length of the signal used by the agents in their decision making process 
when they act as speculators. This is expressed in terms of the past number of days the 
agents look at when they decide whether to buy or sell an asset.  
*  – The number of strategies held by the agents when they act as speculators. By 
construction the  strategies of each agent is chosen randomly in the total pool of 2%& 
strategies at the beginning of the game. 
* λ – The liquidity parameter of the market.  λ will be assumed proportional to  . 
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* M
 – The future expectations about the dividends paid over the entire time horizon 
which is assumed to be constant in time  for simplicity, hence D(t) ≡  D. 
These 5 parameters are mixed together in a reflexive, non-linear $-Game-based market 
dynamics where each agent uses his/her best strategy at every time step giving rise to a complex 
system dynamics where, as the market changes, the best strategies of the agents change too, and 
as the strategies of the agents change, they thereby change the market. 
The dynamics  of the  $-Game is driven by a nonlinear feedback mechanism because each agent 
used his/her best  strategy (fundamental/technical  analysis) at each time step. The sign of the 
order imbalance, ∑ 	∗ gℎ
h*	5- , in turn determines the value of the last bit i
 at time	 for  the 
price movement history ℎ
 + 1 = 
i
 −  + 1, i
 − ,… , i
. The dynamics of the $-
Game can then be expressed in terms of an equation that describes the dynamics of i
 as: 
 i
 + 1 = Θ0∑ 	∗ℎ
 *	5- 1 (7) 
where Θ is a Heaviside function taking the value 1 whenever its argument is larger than 0 and 
otherwise 0, and ℎ
 = ∑ i
 −  + 12E-"5-  is now expressed as a scalar instead of a vector. 
The nonlinearity of the game can be formally seen from: 
 	∗ℎ
 = 	j|lmnopq,…,rR∏tu
ov
Q Ywℎ
  (8) 
with 
 ∏	ℎ
  = ∑ 	ℎ
x − 1 Q45- ∑ 	∗ℎ
x *	5-  (9) 
Inserting the Eqs. 
8 and 
9 in Eq. 
7 one obtains an expression that describes the $-Game in 
terms of just one single equation for i
 depending on the values of the 5 base parameters 
variables 
; 	; 	; 	λ; 	M
 and the random variables 	  (i.e. their initial random assignments). 
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A major complication in the study of this system of equations happens because of the non-
linearity in the selection of the best strategy, and the higher the number of  the complexity of 
the system gets bigger and bigger. The case of  = 2 is however simple to deal with, since one 
only need to know the relative payoff  {	 ≡ /0	-1 − /0	%1 between the two strategies Refs. [19-
20]. Indeed, as proven in the S1_Appendix.doc file for this special case the $-Game is in Nash 
equilibrium with only technical analysis strategies (with no cash nor asset constraints) akin to 
that of Keynes’ “Beauty Contest”, where it becomes profitable for the subjects to guess the 
actions of the other participants. The optimal state is then one for which all subjects cooperate 
and take the same decision (either buy/sell) leading the price into a bubble state where it 
deviates exponentially in time from its fundamental. All subjects profit from further price 
increases/decreases in the bubble state, but it requires coordination among the subjects to enter 
and stay in such a state, see proof in the S1_Appendix.doc file. 
 
Phase transitions in a coarse-grained financial system 
From the point of view of physics, the mathematical modelling of the agents’ decision making 
process described via the i
 dynamics can be understood as a “magnetism”. Such magnetism is 
determined by the “spins” represented by the strategies, in which the interaction between 
different spins (the products of ∑ 	∗ℎ
∙ 	*	5- and 	) are mixed with “free field” terms, namely 
the only terms without a payoff function (see Eq. (13)). Spin models are widely used to describe 
the dynamics of traders in financial markets by several researchers implementing statistical 
physics to inspect complex dynamics in finance. See for e.g., Refs [34, 35].   
We would like to emphasize  such a spins’ analogy of interaction in the description of  a complex 
financial system, in which speculators and fundamentalists interact in a non-linear way with the 
objective to maximize their payoff function. It suggests another and more general perspective in 
order to understand the market dynamics based on the competition between 	  and 	N , namely 
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between technical analysis trading strategies and fundamental analysis trading strategies. Note 
that both technical and fundamental strategies can be active for different traders at the same 
time depending on the optimal strategies the agents possess at a given instant of time. Just like 
there is an interaction between spins in a magnet, there is an indirect interaction between 
market participants through their decision making, since the impact of one agents decision 
making can influence the future decision making of other agents through the price impact. 
Taking this view, the financial market can be conceived as a thermodynamic system where its 
different states are characterized via the so-called free energy |, a concept in physics used to 
quantify the energy transferred by one system to another. The free energy plays a central role in 
physics, since its minimum determines how the state of the system will appear, and can be 
written as 
 |	 = 	P	 − 	}~  (14) 
with P the internal energy of the system, } the temperature and ~ the entropy which one can 
think of as representing how much disorder there is in a given system. From the definition of | 
we can see that the state of a system is determined by a struggle between two different forces, 
one representing “order”, this is the P term, and the other term representing “disorder” given by 
the }~ term.  
A similar struggle of “forces” can be envisioned in the financial market between speculators and 
fundamentalists, where the general tendency to create either a positive/negative price trend 
corresponds to “order” state, whereas either the lack of consensus or the mean reversion to the 
fundamental price value will destroy such order thus moving the system into “disorder” state. 
Transitions and fluctuations in financial market are scrutinized in a number of recent 
contributions such as Ref. [36], in which transition between economic states is studied focusing 
on stock correlations, and in Ref. [37], where macroscopic “phase-flipping” phenomena are 
modeled in a dynamical network setting.  
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In terms of market macro-dynamics, such a reasoning stresses the importance to look at 
interactions among agents when trying to explain whether aggregate decisions are based on 
past price trend (speculative state), or on expected future dividends (fundamental state). The 
classical order (speculative) vs. disorder (fundamentalist) phase transition problem in physics, 
is turned over to fundamentalist (disorder) vs. speculative (order) mood (phase) transitions 
dilemma, that we propose to disentangle by picking up the general properties of the system 
through an adaptation of the well-known Ginzburg-Landau theory. It is with such a view that we 
observe the pen right at the borderline of falling and imagine a price fluctuation around its 
fundamental (fundamental state) until the pen breaks the symmetry by taking a clear direction 
as the price moves into bubble or anti-bubble mood (speculative state). The key point is to 
explain such dynamics through the “temperature” factor in Eq. (14) which moves the system 
from one mood to another.  
 
The Ginzburg-Landau theory  
The central importance of the temperature factor can be seen in Eq. (14), in which we note that 
for temperature } = 0 the minimum of the energy P is therefore also the minimum of the free 
energy |. However as soon as } > 0, the finite temperature will introduce fluctuations in the 
system introducing thereby a non-zero contribution to the entropy ~. The larger the 
temperature } the larger this tendency, until at a certain temperature  above which order has 
completely disappeared, and the system is in a disordered state.  The GL theory explains how 
such a phase transition can be expressed in terms of an order parameter thus describing the 
general properties of the system without examining their microscopic properties. We do the 
same thing by exploring the macro-mechanisms of market transitions, while maintaining 
consistency in the micro-foundation of individual decision making.  
Mathematically, the free energy | in Eq. (14) is assumed to depend on the temperature and the 
magnitude of the order parameter  upon which we can expand the series as follows:   
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 |
}, 	=  + %
}% + -%
} +⋯  (15) 
It should be noted that Eq.  (15) does not contain odd terms (, ,…) in the expansion due to a 
symmetry argument: there is no difference in the free energy for a spin up, respectively spin 
down system. As we will see below a similar financial symmetry exists expressed by the fact that 
there is no difference in the profit from a long, respectively short position. 
Assume: 
 %
} = 
} − ;  > 0 
 
} = i =  > 0 . (16) 
Taking furthermore the derivative in order to find its extreme, we end up with the equation for a 
minimum of |
},, hence determining the state of the system: 
 

},"
" 	= 2
} −  + 2i, (17) 
that has the following solutions:  
 2
} −  + 2i = 0 
1) 
} = 0  } ≥  
2) 
} = ±t 
 − }  } < . (18) 
Solution 1) describes a disordered state, while solution 2) is the solution describing an ordered 
state. The  second solution  determines the value of the critical exponent  when one expresses   
the order parameter as a function of the temperature near the critical point:  
2’)  
} → Ψ
} = 
 − }  } <  (19) 
thus obtaining the so-called “mean field” or GL exponent of the transition  = 0.5.The GL theory 
offers through  a power expansion a functional description of the free energy by integrating over 
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the microscopic degrees of freedom, while constraining their average to 
}. By doing so, the 
phenomenological parameters assume an unknown functional dependence on the original 
microscopic parameters, as well as on the temperature, in this way accounting for the entropy of 
the short distance fluctuations lost in the coarse-graining (micro-to-macro) procedure. 
 
Mood transitions and the order parameter 
The beauty of the GL theory is that one can describe phase transitions, without handling the 
microscopic description of  interactions, simply via a power expansion  of the order parameter. 
The structure of our market price dynamics lends itself to be treated in a similar vein, being 
conceivable as a complex system exhibiting an overall payoff function, as if it were the free 
energy of a thermodynamic system. Single particle movements are equivalent to the non-linear 
agent interactions (since one agent’s decision making can influence other agent’s decision 
making through price impact) that translate into a macro-dynamical environment in which: 
* the ordered state  corresponds to a speculative state,  the price dynamics  is going 
(up/down); 
* the disordered state is instead corresponding to the fundamental state, in which the 
price moves randomly in a mean reversion process towards its fundamental value (Eq. (21)), 
thus destroying the trend in the ordered state.  
To make the analogy with our discussion above (Eq. (14)), we introduce what we call the 
“Market Payoff” () given by two terms in  =  − }~.  
*  is the total profit of the ordered state which for } = 0 corresponds to a continuous 
up/down trend of the market.  
* ~ is an entropy term that destroys the ordered state, and } is the “temperature” which 
move the system from order to disorder and vice versa.  
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As discussed beforehand, the payoff of a strategy in the $-Game is equivalent to its profit, and 
agents use the same strategy over time in a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the total profit  at 
time  for the system of traders can be written as: 
 
 = ∑ /	Z	∗
[	 = ∑ ∑ 	∗
 − 1*5-*	5- ∗
			with	 ≠ , (20) 
where we note that the interactions among traders is, in a sense, “long-ranged”, since trader ’s 
action at time  has an impact on trader ’s profit from the action he/she took at time  − 1.  
In the GL theory the micro-to-macro thermodynamically description of the free energy needs 
consistency between particles micro- and macro-dynamics of the system, and this is obtained via 
the order parameter. Similar to the general case, for describing the macro-mechanisms of mood 
transitions we need an order parameter to expand the “Market Profit”, which also should 
maintain consistency in the micro-foundation of individual decision making.  
As already observed, our trading setup is, in essence, the analog of a “magnetism” determined by 
single strategies chosen by the traders, who act as “atomic spins” moving in two possible 
directions, up (+1) or down (−1). As a result, the system as a whole moves between (and 
within) the two extremes all up (+) and all down (−), as in the physicist two-dimensional 
square-lattice Ising model, where the order parameter to describe phase transition is measured 
by the magnetism, which is just the averaged value of the spins. The Ising model is a model of 
ferromagnetism in which the energy P = −∑ 		,  with 	 and  representing the atomic 
“spins” of a material. The <> − notation in the summation indicates that the sum is to be taken 
over all nearest neighbors pair of spins. Each spin itself can be thought of as a mini magnet. In 
the two-dimensional Ising model the spin 	 = +1 if the spin is “up” and 	 = −1 if the spin is 
“down”. Taking the coupling strength between spins  positive, the minimum energy P"	 of the 
system is simply given by either all spins up (	 ≡ +1), or all spins down (	 ≡ −1). Although our 
trading setup is very similar to the Ising model, there is a major difference that refers to the 
“interaction” mechanism: in our framework, it is “long-ranged” (trader ’s action at time  has an 
impact on trader ’s profit from the action he/she took at time  − 1), whereas the interaction is 
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local (it only concerns nearest-neighbors) for the Ising model. Therefore, the order parameter 
we suggest to use in our market structure is the order imbalance:  
 
} = -*F 4∗ 
*	5- , (21) 
which gives us a simple way to understand phase transitions characterized by the following two 
extreme scenarios: 
1. the case of 
} = -*F 4∗ 
*	5- = ±1 that corresponds to pure order in the system with 
all used strategies taking the same direction (buy or sell) and giving rise to  a bubble or anti-
bubble price path: this is the pure speculative state;  
2.  the case of 
} = -*F 4∗ 
*	5- = 0 that corresponds, instead, to pure disorder in the 
system, with half of the population of used strategies (“spins”) taking one action and the 
remaining taking the opposite action, thus giving rise to a price path around its fundamental: 
this is the pure fundamentalist state. 
 
Financial symmetry 
Applying now the GL idea and expanding MP in terms of 
}, one ends up with the very same 
conditions (Eq. (18)) to determine 
}, but since the objective of traders is to maximize their 
payoff function, the state of the system is determined by its maximum (maxima), instead of the 
minimum (minima), as it was the case for 
}, .  
Formally, by taking the derivative of 
},  and solving for 
} we obtain: 
 

},
 	= 2
} −  + 2i = 0  
1) 
} = 0  } ≥  
2) 
} = ±t 
 − }  } < . (22) 
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Solution 1)	gives 
},  ≡ 0 for 
} = 0, corresponding to no price trend. This is the 
fundamental state in which randomness in price movements leads to no-arbitrage condition 
translating into a financial symmetry with a sort of mean-invariance within the system 
maintaining a general equilibrium in the market.  
Solution 2) is with 
},  > 0  for 
} > 0 or 
} < 0, corresponding to the speculative 
state with up or down price movements  leading to a bubble or anti-bubble state breaking the 
financial symmetry and with agents getting positive profits by going long or short in the market.  
Transitions from fundamental to speculative state are thus modulated through the 
“temperature” parameter, which play a central role in the macro-dynamic of the market. Indeed, 
financial symmetry is broken whenever  the parameter crosses a critical transition point, , 
which move the system from fundamental (with 
},  ≡ 0) to speculative state (
},  >
0).  
Figure 2 illustrates the expansion of  (y-axis) as a function of (x-axis) for the two cases: i) 
the } ≥  solution (i.e. the disordered state corresponding to no trend in the price path with 

} = 0) can be seen as the maximum of the solid line, whereas the two } <  solutions (i.e. 
the ordered state corresponding to a specific trend in the price path with 
} ≠ 0) can be found 
as the maxima of the dashed line. Note that when financial symmetry is “restored” in the market, 
the system is in equilibrium with no difference between profits from going long (buy) or short 
(sell) in the market (the maximum is 
},  ≡ 0). When instead financial symmetry is broken, 
due to a market temperature being less than the critical transition point (} < ), the system 
finds its optima either from going long (
} > 0) or from going short (
} < 0) with the  same 
maximum at 
},  > 0. 
 
The “market temperature” 
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One of the main implication of our GL-based theory of mood transitions in the market is the 
existence of a nontrivial transition from a “high temperature” symmetric state, where traders 
don’t create a trend over time , to a “low temperature” state, characterized by trend following  
with a definite trend in the price trajectories (up or down). We will define in the following a  
“temperature” linked to the randomness of the agent’s actions and suggest how it should be 
measured accordingly.  
In our model setup, randomness enters the $-Game through the initial conditions in the 
assignments of the  strategies to the  traders in the game. In order to create a given strategy 
one has to assign randomly either a 0 or a 1 for each of the 2" different price histories; therefore 
the total pool of strategies increases as 2%& versus . However, many of these strategies are 
closely related: take for e.g. Table 1 changing just one of the 0’s to a 1, and note that this thereby 
creates a strategy which is highly correlated to the one seen in the table.  
Refs. [11, 23] showed how to construct a small subset of size 2" of independent strategies out of 
the total pool of 2%&strategies. As suggested in Refs. [24, 20], a qualitative understanding of this 
problem can  be obtained by considering the parameter  = %&* . Along the same line of 
reasoning, Ref. [25] pointed out, however, that the ratio  = %&*× seems more intuitive, since this 
quantity describes the ratio of the total number of relevant strategies to the total number of 
strategies held by the traders. Based on this intuition, and considering the presence of all 
relevant technical trading strategies (2") together with the fundamental strategy, we then 
introduce the following measure for the market temperature in a speculative vs. fundamental 
moods transition financial system:    
 } = %&-*× , (21) 
where the “+1” in the numerator is because of the fundamental strategy together with the 2" 
uncorrelated speculative strategies. 
20 
 
The relation of } to the fluctuations of the system becomes clear when one consider the fact that 
the variance of a small sample is larger than the variance of a large sample. This statement is 
called  “the law of small numbers” in Psychology/Behavioral Finance and was introduced by 
Tversky and Kahneman (Refs. [26-28]).  In our setup, we have a similar behavior: when the 
sample of strategies  held by the  traders is small with respect to the total pool of relevant 
strategies (reflecting in low denominator of }), this corresponds indeed to the large fluctuations, 
large temperature case. Vice versa a large sample of  strategies held by the  traders 
(increasing denominator of }),  therefore corresponds to a small temperature case as seen from 
the definition of }.  
 
Simulation study 
Experimental design 
In our numerical experiment, we run Monte Carlo simulations based on the 5 parameters of our 
in silico financial system (,, , λ, M
). A number of 200 simulations of the $-Game were run 
where each realization of the game were obtained for up to 200 × 2" time steps. Numerically , 
we performed the experimental design in two main blocks of parameters: 1)  = 2; 2)  = 18. In 
this way we take into account both the case of small number of relevant strategies as well as  the 
case of large number of strategies, since they substantially impact on our } parameter, as 
discussed in the previous section. For both the blocks, simulations were run starting from a 
stock price of 100 and varying parameters as follows: 
*  = 11, 101. The two cases represent a thin and a large market. 
*  = 3, 5, 8. The three values represent the number of past days traders use when 
forming their expectation and subsequently taking an action at time ; the parameter 
ranges from a short to a  relatively long memory of the past; 
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* λ = 10, 100. We consider two levels of market liquidity which has an impact on price 
returns according to (2). The smaller the value of λ the larger the price impact of a given 
fixed value of the order imbalance.  
* M
 = 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100. We used ten possible scenarios for the 
expected dividends ranging from 10 to 100 percent of the dividend yield at the start of 
the simulation experiment (the price is set at 100). To simplify the model, the parameter 
is taken constant in time .     
The speculative and fundamental states are determined via the price path. Specifically, the 
system starts in a fundamental state with a DN
 ≡ 100 and is defined to maintain financial 
symmetry whenever price fluctuations remain within a 50 percentage range (at maximum) of 
the fundamental price DN
 converging to it at the end of the experiments. As discussed in the 
theoretical description of the model, people are assumed to trade shares of the company based 
on their expectations of future dividends, and the numerical experiment ends with the full price 
reflecting the expected dividends payout. This constraint is in line with those used in a large 
number of studies running experiments on stock trades (Refs. [29-33]). 
The speculative state is instead determined whenever  successive price changes had occurred. 
Figure 3 shows three different results representing typical market behavior corresponding to 
fundamental price behavior, as well as speculative behavior in an increasing/decreasing market. 
 
Results 
Figure 4−5 show histograms representing respectively speculative behavior (blue) or 
fundamentalist behavior (red) as outcomes of our trading setup. The histograms in Figure 4 
represent simulations performed with s = 2 whereas the histograms in Figure 5 were done for 
simulations with  = 18. We first notice the somewhat surprising fact that the dividends M
 as 
well as the liquidity of the market  λ, only seem to have a quite limited impact on the final state 
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of the market. In particular, for the smallest  values ( = 3; 5), increasing dividends appear to 
have a somewhat stabilizing effect allowing for slightly more fundamental value states. The 
same stabilizing trend appears to be at play as one increase the liquidity of the market, but 
again, this tendency appears to be very weak. A much clearer tendency is seen with respect to 
increasing speculation when increasing the number of traders , respectively, decreasing the 
amount of information  used in the decision making of the technical analysis trading strategies. 
A larger number of strategies  assigned to the traders is also seen to enhance speculation 
(compare Figure 4 and Figure 5). 
Let us now explore how a qualitative behavior of this trading experiment can be predicted 
depending on our market temperature parameter }. The fact that  } determines the outcome of 
the trading behavior can be easily seen by changing the nominator and denominator by the same 
factor, which then should lead to invariant behavior in terms of trading decisions. This means 
that for example the case of short-run memory and thin market ( = 3; = 11) should give rise 
to a } = 0.8182 ∙ E- trading behavior. Such a trading behavior for a given λ and  should fall in 
between the medium-range memory and large market ( = 5; = 101) (i.e. } = 0.3267 ∙ E-) 
and long-range memory and large market ( = 8; = 101) (i.e. } = 2.5446 ∙ E-) cases. From 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 this is seen indeed to be the case. Similarly comparing Figure 4−5 it is 
seen that increasing (/decreasing)  and decreasing (/increasing)  by the same amount leads 
to two systems behaving similarly in terms of investment profile (compare  = 101 rows in 
Figure 4 to  = 11 rows in Figure 5). Table 2 reports all values for } corresponding to small 
( = 2) and high ( = 18) number of relevant strategies, respectively, showing how memory and 
number of traders impact on market temperature, and in turns on speculative vs. fundamental 
behaviors.  Note that memory length seems to play a major role in moving the system between 
the two states of speculative, respectively fundamentalist behavior. The larger the  the higher 
the temperature, thus moving the aggregate market behavior towards  a more fundamental 
investment oriented state.  These results clearly underscore the importance of the parameter } 
when it comes to the understanding of the aggregate decision making in the model.  
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Concluding remarks 
As discussed in Ref. [38], financial systems are complex adaptive system, in which the micro 
interactions translate into macro dynamics through bottom-up mechanisms, followed by top-
down feedback between the macro and the micro. In this paper we introduced a novel 
theoretical framework to describe financial market macro-dynamics in which single agents 
interact in non-linear and complex ways.  The classical order vs. disorder phase transition 
problem in physics is used here to explain the fundamentalist vs. speculative mood transitions in 
the markets, that we propose to disentangle through a Ginzburg-Landau-based power 
expansion. As observing the pen right at the borderline of falling, we imagine a price fluctuation 
around its fundamental until the pen breaks the symmetry by taking a clear direction as the 
price moves into bubble or anti-bubble mood.  
Our Ginzburg-Landau-based theory of market mood dynamics explains a nontrivial transition 
from a “high temperature” symmetric state, with no price trends over time, to a “low 
temperature” state, with up or down price trends. The key parameter that moves the markets 
from one state to another is the “temperature parameter”, which we derive based on the 
randomness of the agent’s actions, the number and the memory length of traders.  
In our simulation exercise we have shown how a qualitative understanding could be found 
depending on just our temperature parameter, thus bypassing the excessively complicated 
microscopic description of moods in the markets. Indeed, the temperature parameter modulates 
transitions between fundamental and speculative states without examining the micro-dynamics 
of single agents and their interaction impacts on the price path and connected market 
transitions.  
The main message we offer in this paper is that through a phenomenological explanation of 
complex market dynamics, we are able to describe when markets as a whole are expected to 
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change from fundamental to speculative states and vice versa, only by focusing on three 
variables: (1) the number of market traders (), (2) their trading strategies () and (3) their 
past price movements memory (). Together these variables are assembled into the ratio %&-*×  
which is at the core of the complex market dynamics.    
It should be noted that our method provides a framework to test the stability of a given market 
state and understand the influence of an external perturbation. One way to try to drive the 
market from one state to another would for example be to perturb (by e.g. forcing a large 
up/down price move) artificially the market when the agents have driven it into a fundamental 
state (or vice versa into the fundamental state when presently in a speculative state). Whether 
the agents would respond by driving the market further along the direction of the perturbation, 
or on the contrary, drive the market back to its unperturbed state is far from trivial. In Ref. [21] 
it was shown how considering decoupled strategies (see Ref. [21] for definition) was one way to 
get information about how the system of agents would reply to perturbations. 
The proposed general framework can be used to describe the human decision making in a 
certain class of experiments performed in a trading laboratory, allowing us to predict the 
outcome of such type of trading experiments in terms of when to expect a fundamental versus a 
speculative state. Here we focused only on the theoretical description of the model, but in our 
future research agenda we will use our findings to the implementation of trading experiments 
performed in a trading laboratory.    
S1 Appendix: [Special case for the Nash equilibrium of the $-Game ] 
 
. 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1: A pen falls and a symmetry is broken. The figure 1a depicts symmetric state of a 
pen with no clear direction taken. The state is symmetric since there is no a priori preferred 
direction in which the pen would fall. Figure 1b describes the pen falling in one specific direction 
corresponding to a symmetry break  when the finger is lifted. The symmetry break happens 
because a small   fluctuation in the positioning of the pen inevitable happens when lifting the 
finger, leading to a  change of the system from one state (pen held upright on a table with a 
finger) to another (pen suddenly falls in an arbitrary direction). 
 
Figure 2: Market profit, financial symmetry and market temperature. The figure illustrates 
the “Market Profit” of  expansion as a function of order parameter for two different 
“temperatures” corresponding to } ≥  (solid blue line), and two } <  (dashed green line), 
respectively. 
 
Figure 3: Three different market phases. The figure depicts three different examples 
corresponding to (from high to low): fundamental price behavior, speculative behavior in an 
increasing and decreasing market scenarios. 
 
Figure 4: Fundamental vs. speculative market moods with   = ¡. The figure reports 
histograms representing respectively speculative behavior (blue) or fundamentalist behavior 
(red) as outcomes in a setup of the $-Game for  = 2 with given parameter values of (,, , λ, 
M
). 
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Figure 5: Fundamental vs. speculative market moods with   = ¢£. The figure reports 
histograms representing respectively speculative behavior (blue) or fundamentalist behavior 
(red) as outcomes in a setup of the $-Game for  = 18 with given parameter values of (,, , λ, 
M
). 
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Table Legends 
Table 1: Example of speculative trading strategy 
History ¤
¥ Action ¦§¨
¥ 
000 1 
001 -1 
010 -1 
011 1 
100 -1 
101 -1 
110 1 
111 -1 
 
The table show an example of a technical trading strategy for an investor with a history of past 
price movements of   = 3 time steps. For all possible histories of up and down market moves 
over the last  steps, the strategy suggests a specific action to take at  time , namely buy 
(	
 = 1) or sell (	
 = −1).  
 
Table 2: © values  
  = ¡ ª 
« 11 101 
3 0.409 0.045 
5 1.500 0.163 
8 11.682 1.272 
     = ¢£ ª 
« 11 101 
3 0.045 0.005 
5 0.167 0.018 
8 1.298 0.141 
 
The table reports the values of the ratio the } ratio %&-*×  run in our simulation experiment with 
 = 2 and  = 18. For these two scenarios the corresponding matrices derive by crossing  with 
 with  = 11, 101 and  = 3, 5, 8.   
